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1. Introduction 
A key theme in restructuring economies in the developing world is opening local capital 
markets to foreign portfolio investments. This can be accomplished by permitting foreign 
investors to enter the local capital markets directly or by allowing local assets to trade in 
overseas markets. In theory, this permits firms in developing economies to draw from the 
global pool of capital to undertake useful investments that generate profits and employment. 
Furthermore, the scrutiny of foreign investors, foreign analysts and foreign stock listing 
standards can help resolve agency problems, effectively transmitting higher quality reporting 
and governance standards to firms in developing countries (Obstfeld (1998), Stulz (1999)). 
There is now much theory and empirical evidence to support the notion that foreign equity 
capital flows are beneficial. One way foreign equity capital flows benefit local capital markets 
is by causing a fall in the cost of equity capital because of increased risk sharing between 
domestic and foreign agents.
2 This increased risk sharing reduces systematic risk, which in 
turn reduces the cost of equity capital.
3 There is also increasing evidence that openness to 
foreign portfolio investment enhances the governance of local corporations. Doidge (2003), 
for example, reports evidence that cross-listing in the United States affords greater protection 
to minority shareholders. More generally, the evidence in Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) 
suggests that equity market liberalisation tends to spur the process of institutional reform, not 
the other way around. 
In this paper, we examine what attracts foreign investors to the local bond markets. While we 
have much evidence on the dynamics of foreign equity investment, there is little evidence on 
foreign bond investment.
4 The issue is important in that liquidity is essential in order to build 
up mature bond markets and foreign investors are crucial in building liquidity. Foreign 
investors hold at least 20% of government bonds in markets as diverse as Canada, Sweden 
and the United States.
5 For emerging markets that largely lack domestic institutional 
investors such as mutual funds, pension organisations, insurance companies, etc, foreign 
investors are likely to be even more important. They will not only provide demand but also 
bring more varied investment objectives and thus provide liquidity. 
                                                  
1  We thank the discussant and conference participants for their comments. 
2  There is also greater liquidity following increased capital inflows. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Amihud 
et al (1997) discuss the effect of liquidity on equity risk premiums. 
3  The effect of increased risk sharing on equity premiums is discussed in Stapleton and Subrahmanyan (1977), 
Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiramanan (1986), Alexander et al (1987), and Stulz (1999a,b). 
Empirical evidence consistent with the risk sharing view of stock market liberalisation is provided in Henry 
(2000) and Chari and Henry (2002). 
4  See Bekaert and Harvey (2003) and the references therein. 
5  See Exhibit 2 in Beckert and Pitsilis (2000). BIS Papers No 30  103
 
In this paper, we specifically ask whether differences in property rights protection matter for 
foreign bond holdings, after controlling for cross-country differences in macroeconomic 
variables including GNP per capita, lending rates and/or inflation rates and exchange rates. 
Countries differ considerably in terms of the efficiency with which they respect property rights 
and enforce contract laws. For example, Sweden provides strong protection for private 
property rights, but Argentina only weak protection. Recent research indicates that the extent 
to which property rights are secure among countries shows several important differences in 
financial systems. More secure property rights are associated with higher values of stock 
markets (La Porta et al (1997)); a higher number of listed firms (La Porta et al (1997)); higher 
valuation of listed firms relative to their assets (Claessens et al (2002), La Porta et al (2002)); 
greater use of external finance (La Porta et al (1997, 1998, 2000)); and greater investments 
from external funds (Rajan and Zingales (1998), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)). 
If property rights are weakly protected in emerging markets, which is indeed the case, foreign 
investors will charge higher risk premiums to compensate for the additional risk of contract 
repudiation, shorten the duration of bond maturity, or will shy away from these markets 
completely. Therefore, in countries with poor property rights protection, foreign investors are 
likely to make smaller investments. 
To examine these predictions, we use data on bond portfolio holdings in 45 countries (out of 
165 countries in our total sample) for which the rule of law and property rights protection 
quality can be identified. We estimate cross-country regressions in which the dependent 
variables are local currency bonds held by foreign investors. The key variable of interest on 
the right-hand side is an index of property rights protection. We associate countries with high 
levels of corruption, higher risk of expropriation and greater uncertainty about contract 
enforcement as countries with poor property rights protection. The regressions control for 
other possible macroeconomic variables that may also affect the foreign bond holdings. 
Our results show that in countries with better property rights protection, foreign investors buy 
and hold more local bonds. Our results suggest that more secure property rights are 
important in developing liquid and mature bond markets. To the extent that foreign investors 
play a vital role in providing liquidity, our evidence shows that improving property rights 
protection is a matter of prime importance. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our data and variables. 
Section 3 gives the summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the main empirical results, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Data and variables 
2.1  Basic bond holdings data 
We obtain our basic data from the International Monetary Fund website. The most recent 
data show that at end-2001 or end-2002, 67 countries made portfolio investments in foreign 
equity and debt securities and 236 countries received the investments.
6 Since our objective 
                                                  
6  The data are from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) and includes 67 investing countries 
(and bonds held by international organisations and as reserve assets) and 236 countries receiving investment 
(other countries classified as “confidential” and “unallocated” and international organisations). For the 
purposes of the survey, long-term debt securities include bonds, debentures and notes with an original 
maturity of more than one year. Short-term debt securities cover treasury bills, commercial paper and bankers’ 
acceptances with an original maturity of one year or less. 104  BIS Papers No 30
 
is to investigate the determinants of bond holdings by foreign investors, we only examine the 
long-term and short-term debt securities data. From the IMF sample of 236 countries, we 
exclude 71 countries that had investments of less than US$ 1 million in either 2001 or 2002. 
This restriction results in a sample of 67 investor countries investing in 165 recipient 
countries (in a matrix form), both in long- and short-term debt securities. For the regression 
analysis, we use data on bond portfolio holdings of 45 countries for which property rights 
protection quality can be identified, out of 165 countries. 
There is one point worth mentioning about our dataset. Our data source mixes bonds of 
different currencies, especially local currency and US dollar. This might have the effect of 
making our property rights variable less relevant in that the governing law of the bonds per 
se will often be London or New York law rather than local country law. However, in a recent 
paper, Siegel (2005) tests the functional convergence hypothesis, which states that foreign 
firms can leapfrog their countries’ weak legal institutions by listing equities in New York and 
voluntarily abiding by US securities law, and he shows that the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission has rarely been effective in enforcing the law against any US-listed foreign firm. 
In other words, the governing law of the country where the securities are issued or listed may 
not be effective. Ideally, for our analysis we should use the local currency-denominated 
bonds issued in a local country, but the data are not readily available. 
2.2  Measuring property rights protection 
To measure the extent to which a country respects private property rights, we focus on three 
indexes from La Porta et al (1998). These three indexes measure corruption, the risk of 
expropriation of private property and the risk that contracts may be repudiated. 
La Porta et al (1998) describe these three indexes as follows: The “corruption index” is an 
assessment of corruption in government by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Low 
scores indicate that “high government officials are likely to demand special payments” and 
“illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government” in the form of 
“bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy 
protection, or loans”. The “risk of expropriation index” is the ICRG’s assessment of the risk of 
“outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization”. The “index for the repudiation of contracts” is 
the ICRG’s assessment of the “risk of modification in a contract taking the form of repudiation, 
postponement or scaling down” due to “budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in 
government or a change in government economic and social priorities”. 
The range for each index is between zero and 10 with low values indicating less respect for 
private property. All three ICRG indexes are averages from 1982 to 1995. Following Morck et 
al (2000), we combine these three indexes into an additive index of property rights 
protection. The index measures the extent to which a country’s legal systems and institutions 
enforce all contracts, including government contracts. 
We include the natural logarithm of GNP per capita and the level of lending rates in the 
country. We include the latter in order to control for the differences in inflation rates and 
sovereign risks that might also explain cross-country differences. Countries with high inflation 
rates are subject to greater political risks, as there is a greater likelihood that their 
governments will introduce wage and price controls or tamper with indexes. Higher inflation 
rates can raise contracting costs for firms and their bank lenders. According to 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), high and/or variable rates of inflation make it costly 
for investors and firms to contract. The cross-country macroeconomic data are from a 
database compiled by the World Bank (and available on its website). BIS Papers No 30  105
 
3.  Descriptive statistics of the basic bond holdings data 
3.1 Geographical  breakdown 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show geographical breakdowns of long-term and short-term paper 
investments at end-2002.
7 The 67 investing countries in the sample are grouped into six 
regions: East Asia, Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa/Middle East/Southeast Asia 
and Tax Havens.
8 The 165 recipient countries are grouped into the six regions above plus 
Other Nations. 
The total amount of long-term bond investment is more than seven times larger than that of 
short-term paper investment ($6.6 trillion vs $0.88 trillion). Europe is the region that makes 
the largest investment in both long- and short-term paper (48.7% and 43.4%), followed by 
Tax Havens (28.6% and 21.6%), East Asia (8.0% and 12.7%) and North America (7.8% and 
18.1%). Europe is also the largest recipient of bond investment (57.2% and 58.2%), followed 
by North America (23.0% and 27.8%), East Asia (5.4% and 6.1%) and Tax Havens (9.6% 
and 5.7%). 
Focusing on East Asia, we find that as an investor, it makes only a small proportion of total 
bond investment in its own regional bonds (14.3% and 27.8%). On the other hand, East Asia 
receives a much larger or the largest proportion of bond investment from the region (21.6% 
and 58.0%). In particular, more than half of East Asian short-term paper investment comes 
from the region. This might suggest that due to the weak property rights enforced in East 
Asia, foreign investors are likely to shorten the duration of bond maturity to minimise the risk 
of contract repudiation. This might also suggest that there is a regional bias in bond holdings 
by foreign investors, similar to the much-documented home bias found in stock investment.
9 
3.2  East Asian country breakdown 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show East Asian country breakdowns of long-term and short-term paper 
investments. There are three dominant countries that invest in East Asian bonds: Hong Kong 
SAR, Japan and Singapore. Together they make up more than 90% of the total investment 
East Asia makes in its own region. However, the profile of countries receiving bond 
investment is quite different. Australia, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and New Zealand 
receive the majority of the investment. However, it is interesting to note that Australia, which 
attracts the largest investment (42.7% and 53.6%) from East Asia, makes an insignificant or 
zero amount of bond investment in other East Asian countries.
10 
3.3  Top 10 country breakdown 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the top 10 countries’ bond investments in seven different regions. 
Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Luxembourg appear to be the 
most important buyers. As the group of largest investors, the top 10 countries invest mostly 
                                                  
7  For summary statistics, we only report results for end-2002, because those for end-2001 are similar. We use 
the terms long-term and short-term bonds or paper for long-term and short-term debt securities. 
8  We use the list of tax havens compiled by EscapeArtist Inc which can be obtained from the website 
EscapeArtist.com. 
9  For more on the regional bias issue, please also refer to McCauley and Park (2006). 
10  This pattern appeared for New Zealand for end-2001 which is not reported here. Considering Australia and 
New Zealand are both common law countries, one might maintain that the rule of law argument is at work 
here, but it is premature to do so without further analysis. 106  BIS Papers No 30
 
in Europe and North America, and East Asia receives about 4% of their total bond 
investment. Japan’s investment in East Asian bonds also appears to be minimal, taking only 
3-7% of its total investment. 
3.4  Rule of law breakdown of bond investment 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show rule of law breakdowns. We follow Stulz and Williamson (2003) who 
classify 51 countries into four classes of rule of law: common law, civil/French, civil/German 
and civil/Scandinavian.
11 The results show that the largest proportion of bond investment 
goes to common law countries (38% and 63%) where investor protection is deemed 
strongest. The second largest proportion goes to civil/French law countries (33% and 19%) 
that are generally regarded to provide weaker investor protection. 
One might speculate that in the common law countries, investors would invest relatively more 
in long-term bonds than in short-term paper because investor protection tends to be strong in 
these countries, whereas they would invest relatively more in short-term paper in civil/French 
countries where investor protection tends to be weaker. However, no such evidence is found 
from the descriptive statistics. It appears that more investment is made in common law 
countries in both long-term and short-term paper. In the next section, we conduct a formal 
analysis on how investor rights protection affects foreign bond holdings. 
                                                  
11  See Table 1 of Stulz and Williamson (2003). BIS Papers No 30  107
 
Table 3.1 
Geographical breakdown of long-term 
bond investment, end-2002 























76,376 109,154 16,997  12,816  399  138,430  354,172 
[21.56%]
2 [30.82%]  [4.80%]  [3.62%]  [0.12%]  [39.09%]  [100%] 
East Asia (14) 
{14.43%}
3 {3.39%}  {3.28%}  {2.86%}  {9.18%} {7.33%} {5.36%} 
266,466 1,839,011 391,025  327,960  934  958,945 3,784,341
[7.04%] [48.60%]  [10.33%] [8.67%] [0.02%]  [25.34%] [100%] 
Europe (42) 
{50.35%} {57.16%} {75.44%} {73.08%} {21.51%} {50.75%} {57.28%} 
141,327  789,129  83,098 92,070  2,061 411,900  1,519,585
[9.30%] [51.93%] [5.47%]  [6.06%] [0.14%]  [27.11%] [100%] 
North 
America (2) 
{26.70%} {24.53%} {16.03%} {20.52%} {47.44%} {21.80%} {23.00%} 
7,172 40,733 4,246  3,150  256  47,881  103,438 
[6.93%] [39.38%] [4.10%]  [3.05%] [0.25%]  [46.29%] [100%] 
Latin 
America (21) 
{1.35%} {1.27%} {0.82%} {0.70%} {5.88%} {2.53%} {1.57%} 
1,085 12,266 1,051  1,666  5  8,226 24,299 




Asia  (42)  {0.21%} {0.38%} {0.20%} {0.37%} {0.11%} {0.44%} {0.37%} 
31,201 384,443 21,728  9,553  689  187,129  634,743 
[4.92%] [60.57%] [3.42%]  [1.51%] [0.11%]  [29.48%] [100%] 
Tax 
Havens (44) 
{5.89%} {11.95%} {4.19%}  {2.13%} {15.87%} {9.90%}  {9.61%} 
5,616  42,357  148 1,526  – 136,945  186,592 
[3.01%] [22.70%] [0.08%]  [0.82%] [0.00%]  [73.39%] [100%] 
Other 
Nations (73) 
{1.06%} {0.03%} {0.03%} {0.34%} {0.00%} {7.25%} {2.82%} 
529,243 3,217,093 518,293  448,741  4,344  1,889,456  6,607,170
[8.01%] [48.69%] [7.84%]  [6.79%] [0.07%]  [28.60%] [100%] 
Subtotal 
{100%} {100%} {100%} {100%} {100%} {100%} {100%} 
1  In (  ) next to the region’s name is the number of countries.   
2  In [  ] is the percentage when the IN country 
subtotal (far right) is 100%.   
3  In {  } is the percentage when the FROM country subtotal (bottom) is 100%. 
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Table 3.2 
Geographic breakdown of short-term 
paper investment, end-2002 























31,024 10,285  3,336  –  18  8,849  53512 
[57.98%]
2 [19.22%]  [6.23%]  [0.00%]  [0.03%]  [16.54%] [100.00%]
East Asia (14) 
{27.78%}
3 {2.46%}  {2.09%}  {0.00%}  {2.29%} {4.65%} {6.07%} 
36,477 243,419  131,240  279  169  101,359  512,943 
[7.11%] [47.46%]  [25.59%] [0.05%] [0.03%]  [19.76%]  [100.00%]
Europe (42) 
{32.66%} {58.25%} {82.19%} {15.20%} {21.50%} {53.28%} {58.15%} 
21,595 133,897 19,475  1,101  244  69,186 245,498 
[8.80%] [54.54%] [7.93%]  [0.45%]  [0.10%] [28.18%]  [100.00%]
North 
America (2) 
{19.33%} {32.04%} {12.20%} {60.00%} {31.04%} {36.37%} {27.83%} 
6 959  357  19  2  2,621  3,964 
[0.15%] [24.19%] [9.01%]  [0.48%]  [0.05%] [66.12%]  [100.00%]
Latin 
America (21) 
{0.01%} {0.23%} {0.22%} {1.04%} {0.25%} {1.38%} {0.45%} 
126 833  –  18  34  129  1,140 




Asia (42)  {0.11%}  {0.20%}  {0.00%} {0.98%} {4.33%} {0.07%} {0.13%} 
18,267  18,027  5,272 398  319 7,884  50,167 
[36.41%] [35.93%] [10.51%]  [0.79%] [0.64%]  [15.72%]  [100.00%]
Tax Havens (44) 
{16.35%} {4.31%}  {3.30%} {21.69%} {40.59%}  {4.14%}  {5.69%} 
4,200 10,488  5  20  –  216  14,929 
[28.13%]  [70.25%]  [0.03%] [0.13%] [0.00%] [1.45%]  [100.00%]
Other 
Nations (73) 
{3.76%} {2.51%} {0.00%} {1.09%} {0.00%} {0.11%} {1.69%} 
111,695 417,908 159,685  1,835  786  190,244 882,153 
[12.66%]  [43.37%]  [18.10%] [0.21%]  [0.09%] [21.57%]  [100.00%]
Subtotal 
{100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%}
1  In (  ) next to the region’s name is the number of countries.   
2  In [  ] is the percentage when the IN country 
subtotal (far right) is 100%.   




























East Asian country breakdown of 
long-term debt securities, year-end 2002
1 







Indonesia Japan Korea  Malaysia  New 
Zealand  Philippines  Singapore Thailand Subtotal 
– 11,333 1 17,092 20  26  358  10  3,761  – 32,601 
[0.00%]
2 [34.76%]  [0.00%]  [52.43%]  [0.06%]  [0.08%]  [1.10%] [0.03%]  [11.54%]  [0.00%]  [100.00%] 
Australia 
{0.00%}
3 {41.72%}  {1.14%}  {57.01%}  {1.66%} {15.78%}  {50.42%}  {7.52%} {22.53%}  {0.00%}  {42.67%} 
– 1,232 –  578  38  –  –  2  416  – 2,266 
[0.00%] [54.37%] [0.00%] [25.50%] [1.69%]  [0.00%] [0.00%]  [0.09%] [18.37%]  [0.00%]  [100.00%] 
China 
{0.00%} {4.54%} {0.00%} {1.93%} {3.18%} {0.00%} {0.00%}  {1.51%} {2.49%}  {0.00%}  {2.97%} 
– – 57  1,137  455  40 – 58  1,653  20  3,421 
[0.00%] [0.00%] [1.67%] [33.23%]  [13.30%] [1.17%] [0.00%]  [1.70%] [48.33%]  [0.58%]  [100.00%] 
Hong Kong 
SAR 
{0.00%} {0.00%} {64.80%} {3.79%} {37.86%}  {24.45%} {0.00%}  {43.82%} {9.91%}  {100.00%}  {4.48%} 
– – – 49  78 1 –  4 869  –  1,000 
[0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [4.86%] [7.77%] [0.09%] [0.00%]  [0.40%] [86.90%]  [0.00%]  [100.00%] 
Indonesia 
{0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.16%} {6.46%} {0.55%} {0.00%}  {3.01%} {5.21%}  {0.00%}  {1.31%} 
–  5,351  –  – 29 –  282 5  3,828  –  9,495 
[0.00%]  [56.36%]  [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.31%] [0.00%] [2.97%]  [0.05%] [40.31%]  [0.00%]  [100.00%] 
Japan 
{0.00%} {19.70%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {2.41%} {0.00%}  {39.75%} {3.74%} {22.93%}  {0.00%}  {12.43%} 
– 4,202 – 5,348 –  51  69  15 2,586 –  12,271 
[0.00%] [34.24%] [0.00%] [43.58%] [0.00%]  [0.42%] [0.56%]  [0.12%] [21.07%]  [0.00%]  [100.00%] 
Korea 
{0.00%} {15.47%} {0.00%} {17.84%} {0.00%} {31.38%} {9.77%}  {11.12%} {15.49%} {0.00%} {16.06%} 
– 2,085 3 1,823  332  –  –  9  1,830 – 6,083 
[0.00%] [34.28%] [0.05%] [29.98%] [5.46%]  [0.00%] [0.00%]  [0.15%] [30.08%]  [0.00%]  [100.00%] 
Malaysia 
























Table 3.3 (cont) 
East Asian country breakdown of 
long-term debt securities, year-end 2002 







Indonesia Japan Korea  Malaysia  New 
Zealand  Philippines  Singapore Thailand Subtotal 
251  –  – 1,258 –  –  –  –  279  –  1,788 
[14.03%] [0.00%]  [0.00%] [70.36%] [0.00%]  [0.00%] [0.00%]  [0.00%] [15.63%]  [0.00%]  [100.00%] 
New 
Zealand 
{99.93%} {0.00%}  {0.00%}  {4.20%} {0.00%} {0.02%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {1.67%}  {0.00%}  {2.34%} 
– – 5  1,389  81 4 –  – 595  –  2,074 
[0.00%] [0.00%] [0.22%] [66.96%] [3.92%] [0.22%] [0.00%]  [0.00%] [28.68%]  [0.00%]  [100.00%] 
Philippines 
{0.00%} {0.00%} {5.12%} {4.63%} [6.76%} {2.73%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {3.56%}  {0.00%}  {2.71%} 
–  1,842  23 680  144 41  –  23  –  –  2,753 
[0.00%] [66.91%] [0.82%] [24.69%] [5.23%]  [1.49%] [0.00%]  [0.84%]  [0.00%] [0.00%]  [100.00%] 
Singapore 
{0.00%} {6.78%} {25.69%} {2.27%} {11.98%}  {25.05%} {0.00%}  {17.43%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {3.60%} 
–  674  –  46  – – –  7  333  –  1,060 
[0.00%]  [63.58%]  [0.00%] [4.32%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%]  [0.66%] [31.40%]  [0.00%]  [100.00%] 
Taiwan, 
China 
{0.00%} {2.48%} {0.00%} {0.15%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%}  {5.27%} {1.99%}  {0.00%}  {1.39%} 
– 447 – 550 24  1  –  –  542 –  1,564 
[0.00%] [28.58%] [0.00%] [35.20%] [1.53%]  [0.04%] [0.00%]  [0.00%] [34.64%]  [0.00%]  [100.00%] 
Thailand 
{0.00%} {1.65%} {0.00%} {1.84%} {2.00%} {0.34%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {3.25%}  {0.00%}  {2.05%} 
252 27,167  89  29,951  1,203  165  710  134  16,693  21 76,376 
[0.33%] [35.55%] [0.12%] [39.24%] [1.57%]  [0.22%] [0.93%]  [0.17%] [21.85%]  [0.03%]  [100.00%] 
Subtotal 
{100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%}  {100.00%}  {100.00%} {100.00%}  {100.00%} 
1  Data for Vietnam and Cambodia are not reported here.   
2  In [  ] is the percentage when the IN country subtotal (far right) is 100%.   
3  In {  } is the percentage when the FROM 



























East Asian country breakdown of 
short-term debt securities, year-end 2002
1 







Indonesia Japan Korea  Malaysia  New 
Zealand  Philippines  Singapore Thailand Subtotal 
– 9,795 – 1,657 –  –  –  –  5,130  50  16,632 
[0.00%]
2  [58.89%]  [0.00%] [9.96%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%]  [0.00%] [30.84%]  [0.30%] [100%] 
Australia 
{0.00%}
3 {64.39%}  {0.00%]  {47.65%}  {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {42.11%}  {69.44%}  {53.61%} 
–  1,569  – – – – –  – 53  –  1,622 
[0.00%]  [94.40%]  [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%]  [0.00%]  [3.17%] [0.00%] [100%] 
China 
{0.00%} {10.31%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {0.43%}  {0.00%}  {5.23%} 
– – –  12  4 – – 50  111  2  179 
[0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [6.52%] [2.40%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [27.93%]  [62.018%] [1.12%] [100%] 
Hong Kong 
SAR 
{0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.34%} {18.70%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {100.00%} {0.91%}  {2.78%} {0.58%} 
– – – 2 – – –  – 89  –  90 
[0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [1.85%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%]  [0.00%] [98.63%]  [0.00%] [100%] 
Indonesia 
{0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.05%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {0.73%}  {0.00%}  {0.29%} 
–  1,396  – – – – 1  –  2,789  –  4,186 
{0.00%}  [33.35%]  [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.02%]  [0.00%] [66.63%]  [0.00%] [100%] 
Japan 
{0.00%} {9.18%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%}  {100.00%} {0.00%} {22.90%}  {0.00%}  {13.49%} 
–  1,761  –  125  – 9 –  –  523  10  2,428 
[0.00%]  [72.53%]  [0.00%] [5.15%] [0.00%] [0.35%] [0.00%]  [0.00%] [21.56%]  [0.41%] [100%] 
Korea 
{0.00%} {11.58%} {0.00%}  {3.60%}  {0.00%} {94.68%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {4.30%}  {13.89%}  {7.83%} 
– 43 –  – 19 –  –  – 126  –  187 
[0.00%]  [22.99%]  [0.00%] [0.00%] [9.89%] [0.00%] [0.00%]  [0.00%] [67.20%]  [0.00%] [100%] 
Malaysia 

























Table 3.4 (cont) 
East Asian country breakdown of 
short-term debt securities, year-end 2002 







Indonesia Japan Korea  Malaysia  New 
Zealand  Philippines  Singapore Thailand Subtotal 
– – –  171  – – –  –  2,754  10  2,935 
[0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [5.83%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%]  [0.00%] [93.82%]  [0.34%] [100%] 
New 
Zealand 
{0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {4.92%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {22.60%}  {13.89%}  {9.46%} 
– – – – – – –  –  104  –  104 
[0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%]  [0.00%] [0.00%]  [0.00%]  [100%] 
Philippines 
{0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {0.86%}  {0.00%}  {0.34%} 
–  303  – 1,510 –  –  –  –  –  –  1,814 
[0.00%] [16.70%] [0.02%] [83.26%] [0.00%]  [0.03%] [0.00%]  [0.00%]  [0.00%] [0.00%] [100%] 
Singapore 
{0.00%} [1.99%} {0.00%} {43.44%}  {0.00%} {5.54%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {0.00%}  {0.00%}  {5.85%} 
–  131  – – – – –  –  224  –  355 
[0.00%]  [36.90%]  [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%]  [0.00%] [62.97%]  [0.00%] [100%] 
Taiwan, 
China 
{0.00%} {0.86%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {1.84%}  {0.00%}  {1.14%} 
–  213  – – – – –  –  279  –  492 
[0.00%]  [43.29%]  [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%] [0.00%]  [0.00%] [56.81%]  [0.00%] [100%] 
Thailand 
{0.00%} {1.40%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%} {0.00%}  {0.00%} {2.29%}  {0.00%}  {1.59%} 
– 15,211 –  3,477 23  9  1  50 12,182  72  31,024 
[0.00%] [49.03%] [0.00%] [11.21%] [0.07%]  [0.03%] [0.00%]  [0.16%] [39.27%]  [0.23%] [100%] 
Subtotal 
{100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} 
1  Data for Vietnam and Cambodia are not reported here.   
2  In [  ] is the percentage when the IN country subtotal (far right) is 100%.   
3  In {  } is the percentage when the 


























Top 10 country breakdown of long-term 
debt securities investment, year-end 2002 






Kingdom  Germany  Luxembourg Italy Netherlands Japan  France  Canada Cayman 
Islands  Subtotal 
60,227 50,087 13,750  16,113  3,821  3,769 29,951  15,733 627  899 194,977 
[30.89%]





3 {6.42%}  {2.52%}  {3.12%}  {1.25%} {1.10%}  {2.79%} {2.63%} {4.10%} {2.13%} {4.16%} 
230,012 345,738 426,727  390,163 190,146 265,737  413,010 450,439  2,605  3,190 2,717,766 
[8.46%] [12.72%] [15.70%]  [14.36%] [7.00%]  [9.78%] [15.20%]  [16.57%] [0.10%] [0.12%]  [100.00%] 
Europe (42) 
{49.04%} {44.31%} {78.15%}  {75.64%} {62.32%} {77.87%}  {38.47%} {75.37%} {17.01%}  {7.55%}  {57.99%} 
106,024 206,101  57,071  82,675  43,198  60,612  395,281 78,321  7,988  31,770 1,069,044 
[9.92%] [19.28%] [5.34%]  [7.73%] [4.04%] [5.67%] [36.98%]  [7.33%] [0.75%] [2.97%]  [100.00%] 
North 
America (2) 
{22.60%} {26.41%} {10.45%}  {16.03%} {14.16%} {17.76%} {36.82%} {13.11%} {52.15%} {75.19%} {22.81%} 
33,863 10,794  7,676  4,236  11,489  2,453  8,472  3,264  1,989  5,404  89,640 
[37.78%] [12.04%]  [8.56%]  [4.73%]  [12.82%]  [2.74%] [9.45%]  [3.64%] [2.22%] [6.03%]  [100.00%] 
Latin 
America 
(21)  {7.22%} {1.38%} {1.41%}  {0.82%} {3.77%} {0.72%} {0.79%}  {0.55%}  {12.99%}  {12.79%}  {1.91%} 
4,273 2,643 4,890  1,044 1,515  238  3,737  723  29  178 19,270 





Asia (42)  {0.91%} {0.34%} {0.90%}  {0.20%} {0.50%} {0.07%} {0.35%}  {0.12%} {0.19%} {0.42%} {0.41%} 
33,746 60,705 35,948  21,436 52,185  8,467  210,916  48,923  1,869  185  474,411 
[7.11%] [12.80%] [7.58%]  [4.52%] [11.00%] [1.78%]  [44.46%]  [10.31%] [0.39%]  [0.04%]  [100.00%] 
Tax 
Havens (44) 

























Table 3.5 (cont) 
Top 10 country breakdown of long-term 
debt securities investment, year-end 2002 






Kingdom  Germany  Luxembourg Italy Netherlands Japan  France  Canada Cayman 
Islands  Subtotal 
910 104,219  3  148  2,750  3  12,152  221  209  629 121,244 
[0.75%] [85.96%] [0.00%]  [0.12%]  [2.27%]  [0.00%] [10.02%]  [0.18%] [0.17%] [0.52%]  [100.00%] 
Other 
Nations (73) 
{0.19%} {13.36%} {0.00%}  {0.03%} {0.90%} {0.00%} {1.13%}  {0.04%} {1.36%} {1.49%} {2.59%} 
469,055 780,287 546,065  515,815 305,105 341,279 1,073,551 597,623  15,316  42,255 4,686,351 
[10.01%] [16.65%] [11.65%]  [11.01%] [6.51%] [7.28%] [22.91%]  [12.75%] [0.33%]  [0.90%]  [100.00%] 
Subtotal 
{100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%}  {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} 
1  In (  ) next to the region’s name is the number of countries.   
2  In [  ] is the percentage when the IN country subtotal (far right) is 100%.   
3  In {  } is the percentage when the 



























Top 10 country breakdown of short-term debt 
securities investment, year-end 2002 






Kingdom  Germany  Luxembourg Italy Netherlands Japan  France  Canada  Cayman 
Islands  Subtotal 
3,323 5,396  49  4,550  346  486  3,477 858  13  158 18,656 
[17.81%]





3 {7.04%} {0.36%}  {4.97%}  {3.77%}  {5.32%}  {7.23%} {1.22%}  {0.30%}  {2.01%}  {3.84%} 
130,171 41,468  9,434  53,290  7,740  6,178  11,940 50,503  1,069  2,956  314,749 
[41.36%] [13.17%]  [3.00%]  [16.93%]  [2.46%]  [1.961%] [3.79%]  [16.04%]  [0.35%]  [0.94%]  [100%] 
Europe (42) 
{83.81%} {54.07%} {69.22%}  {58.20%} {84.36%} {67.68%} {24.83%}  {71.80%} {24.48%} {37.68%} {64.74%} 
16,324 18,690  3,990  28,868  246  1,582  15,153  14,886 3,151  3,710 106,600 
[15.31%] [17.53%]  [3.74%]  [27.08%]  [0.23%]  [1.48%] [14.21%]  [14.00%]  [2.96%]  [3.48%]  [100%] 
North 
America (2) 
{10.51%} {24.37%} {29.28%}  {31.53%}  {2.68%}  {17.33%} {31.52%}  {21.16%} {72.15%} {47.30%} {21.93%} 
357 712  8  117  46  15  –  47  –  617  1,919 
[18.60%] [37.10%]  [0.42%]  [6.10%]  [2.40%]  [0.78%] [0%]  [2.50%]  [0%]  [32.15%]  [100%] 
Latin 
America 
(21)  {0.23%} {0.93%} {0.06%}  {0.13%} {0.50%} {0.16%} {0.00%}  {0.07%}  {0.00%} {7.87%} {0.39%} 
– 538 7  26  –  72  – 1  –  7 651 





Asia (42)  {0.00%} {0.70%} {0.05%}  {0.03%} {0.00%} {0.79%} {0.00%}  {0.00%}  {0.00%} {0.09%} {0.13%} 
5,143 1,962  141  4,685  797  793 17,318  4,023  129  292 35,283 
[14.58%] [5.56%]  [0.40%]  [13.28%] [2.26%]  [2.25%] [49.08%]  [11.40%]  [0.37%]  [0.83%]  [100%] 
Tax Havens 
(44) 

























Table 3.6 (cont) 
Top 10 country breakdown of short-term debt 
securities investment, year-end 2002 






Kingdom  Germany  Luxembourg Italy Netherlands Japan  France  Canada  Cayman 
Islands  Subtotal 
– 7,933 –  26  –  2  192  18  5  104  8,280 
[0.00%] [95.81%] [0.00%]  [0.31%]  [0.00%]  [0.02%] [2.32%]  [0.22%]  [0.06%] [1.26%] [100%] 
Other 
Nations (73) 
{0.00%} {10.34%} {0.00%}  {0.03%} {0.00%} {0.02%} {0.40%}  {0.03%} {0.11%} {1.33%} {1.70%} 
155,318 76,699  13,629  91,562  9,175  9,128 48,080  70,336  4,367  7,844  486,138 
[31.95%] [15.78%]  [2.80%]  [18.83%]  [1.89%]  [1.88%] [9.90%]  [14.47%]  [0.90%] [1.61%] [100%] 
Subtotal 
{100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%}  {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} 
1  In (  ) next to the region’s name is the number of countries.   
2  In [  ] is the percentage when the IN country subtotal (far right) is 100%.   
3  In {  } is the percentage when the 
FROM country subtotal (bottom) is 100%. 
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Table 3.7 
Rule of law breakdown of long-term 
bonds, year-end 2002 














582,835 235,504 722,734  64,783 1,605,856 
[36.29%]
2 [14.67%] [45.01%]  [4.03%]  [100%] 
Common (19) 
{42.66%}
3 {23.01%} {42.35%} {36.06%} {37.56%} 
439,889 468,920 460,009  42,478 1,411,296 
[31.17%] [33.23%] [32.59%]  [3.01%]  [100%] 
Civil/French (22) 
{32.20%} {45.82%} {26.95%} {23.65%} {33.01%} 
300,796 287,216 449,774  53,658 1,091,444 
[27.56%] [26.32%] [41.21%]  [4.92%]  [100%] 
Civil/German (6) 
{22.02%} {28.07%} {26.35%} {29.87%} {25.53%} 
42,627 31,740 74,228 18,729  167,323 
[25.48%] [18.97%] [44.36%] [11.19%]  [100%] 
Civil/ 
Scandinavian (4) 
{3.12%} {3.10%} {4.35%} {10.43%} {3.91%} 
1,366,149 1,023,379 1,706,745 179,647 4,275,920 
[31.95%] [23.93%] [39.92%]  [4.20%]  [100%] 
Subtotal 
{100%} {100%} {100%} {100%} {100%} 
1  In (  ) next to the region’s name is the number of countries.   
2  In [  ] is the percentage when the IN country 
subtotal (far right) is 100%.   
3  In {  } is the percentage when the FROM country subtotal (bottom) is 100%. 
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Table 3.8 
Rule of law breakdown of short-term 
paper, year-end 2002 














292,708 62,775  30,318  3,922  389,723 
[75.11%]
2 [16.11%]  [7.77%]  [1.01%]  [100%] 
Common (19) 
{68.96%}
3 {47.84%} {53.48%} {42.74%} {62.70%} 
63,700 36,078 17,351  1,046 118,175 
[53.90%] [30.53%] [14.68%]  [0.89%]  [100%] 
Civil/French (22) 
{15.01%} {27.50%} {30.60%} {11.40%} {19.01%} 
53,424  25,119 6,619  1,571 86,733 
[61.60%] [28.96%]  [7.63%]  [1.811%]  [100%] 
Civil/German (6) 
{12.59%} {19.14%} {11.67%} {17.12%} {13.95%} 
14,615 7,243  2,406  2,637 26,901 
[54.33%] [26.92%]  [8.94%]  [9.80%]  [100%] 
Civil/ 
Scandinavian (4) 
{3.44%} {5.52%} {4.24%} {28.74%} {4.33%} 
424,447 131,215  56,694  9,176  621,532 
[68.30%] [21.11%]  [9.12%]  [1.48%]  [100%] 
Subtotal 
{100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} {100.00%} 
1  In (  ) next to the region’s name is the number of countries.   
2  In [  ] is the percentage when the IN country 
subtotal (far right) is 100%.   
3  In {  } is the percentage when the FROM country subtotal (bottom) is 100%. 
 
4. Regression  results 
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating cross-country regressions that examine 
whether differences in foreign bond investments can be accounted for by cross-country 
differences in property rights protection, while controlling for other macro factors that may be 
important. 
4.1  Summary statistics of the regression sample 
In Table 4.1, we present the list of 47 sample countries and some of the variables used in the 
regression analysis. We partition the sample into two groups by the median of the property 
right index. One clear message delivered by the table is that countries with stronger investor 
protection show larger GDP and have more local bonds held by foreign investors. The 
percentage of local bonds held by foreign investors scaled by GDP is 7.18% for countries 
with low investor protection, whereas the same figure is as much as 35.5% for countries with 
high property rights protection. Table 4.2 presents some summary statistics and correlations 
used in the analysis.  



































Countries with low property rights protection 
ARG 606  21,485  268,831  8.22  2  16.84  1 
BRA 2,984  43,500  508,994  9.13  2  20.24  1 
CHL  80  4,332 66,450 6.64  2  19.60  2 
COL  31  5,886 82,411 7.18  2  18.97  0 
ECU  14  1,233 21,024 5.93  2  16.93  4 
EGY  48  491 98,476 0.55  2  16.22  4 
GRC 460  61,302  117,169  52.71  2  21.01  1 
IDN 79  1,597  141,255  1.19  2  15.40  4 
IND 214  1,766  481,440  0.41  1  18.44  4 
JOR 18  176  8,829  2.20  2  16.41  . 
KEN  22  18 11,396 0.35  1  16.46  4 
KOR 2,018  22,425  427,234  5.72  3  22.20  3 
LKA  31  130 15,662 1.02  1  16.30  3 
MEX 742  42,802  623,890  6.98  2  18.61  0 
MYS 292  9,538  88,050  11.16  1  22.76  4 
PAK  22  244 58,648 0.45  1  13.47  4 
PER  143  1,792 54,218 3.57  2  14.92  0 
PHL 332  8,804  71,382  12.80  2  12.94  0 
THA 348  3,607  115,310  3.43  1  20.17  3 
TUR 575  11,833  145,244  8.54  2  18.13  2 
URY  129  1,629 18,561 9.47  2  18.87  2 
VEN 226  8,544  126,197  6.95  2  17.89  . 
ZWE 17  39  9,057  0.62  1  16.07  4 
Average 410  11,008  154,771  7.18  .  18  2 
Countries with high property rights protection 
AUS 25,448  73,916  368,726  26.95 1 26.50 1 
AUT 6,512  104,400  188,546  58.83  3  27.86  3 
BEL 22,536  97,354  229,610  52.22 2 27.93 2 
CAN 14,872  196,559  694,475  30.44 1 28.63 1 
CHE 3,297  13,828  247,091  6.93  3  29.96  1 
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Countries with high property rights protection 
DEU 84,910  802,257  1,846,069  48.06 3 28.60 3 
DNK 6,036  51,119  161,542  35.38  4  28.98  3 
ESP 5,724  165,876  581,823 29.49  2  25.30  2 
FIN 3,639  37,677  120,855  34.19  4 28.82 1 
FRA 56,589  331,120  1,309,807  29.60 2 27.89 0 
GBR 174,385  394,595  1,424,094  39.95  1  28.44  4 
HKG 505  15,691  162,843  9.95  1  25.63  4 
IRL 12,496  67,419  103,298  77.36  1  27.15  1 
ISR 91  8,996  .  .  1  24.12  4 
ITA 31,564  428,540  1,088,754  42.26  2  24.65  2 
JPN 36,127  167,520  4,141,431  4.92 3 27.88 2 
NLD 39,538  371,334  380,137  108.09 2 29.33 2 
NOR 2,584  32,007  166,145  20.82  4  29.59  2 
NZL 3,844  9,145  50,425  25.76  1  28.98  3 
PRT 3,278  44,617  109,803  43.62  2  24.85  1 
SGP 1,233  13,228  84,871  17.04  1  26.38  4 
SWE 14,220  84,280  209,814  46.95  4  28.98  2 
USA 418,135  1,660,138  10,065,270 20.65  1  27.61  1 
ZAF 255  7,085  114,174  6.43  1  23.07  3 
Average 40,326  215,779  1,036,939 35.47  .  27  2 
This table presents the amount of local bonds held by foreign investors as of the end of 2001, gross 
domestic product in 2001, percentage of bonds over GDP, legal origin indicator, property rights 
index and creditor rights index for each of 47 sample countries. The property rights index is the sum 
of three indexes from La Porta et al (1998). Legal origin indicator “1” is English origin, “2” French, 
“3” German, and “4” Scandinavian. Each index ranges from zero to 10. Each index measures 
government corruption, the risk of expropriation by the government and the risk of the government 
repudiating contracts. High values of property rights indexes indicate better protection of property 
rights. The creditor rights index is the sum of four dummy variables, each of which measures “no 
automatic stay on assets”, “secured creditors first”, “restrictions for going into reorganization” and 
“current management does not stay in the reorganized firm”. High values of creditor rights indicate 
better protection of creditor rights.  
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Table 4.2 
Summary statistics of variables 
Panel A: summary statistics 
Variable N  Mean  Std  dev  Minimum  Maximum 
Short-term debts/GDP  47  2.33  3.37  0.04  12.25 
Long-term debts/GDP  47  18.56  20.61  0.15  97.68 
Property rights index  47  22.68  5.33  12.94  29.96 
Creditor rights index  45  2.00  1.00  1.00  4.00 
GDP per capital  47  15,053  13,686  332  48,160 
Inflation  rate  46  5.90 12.52 –3.97 64.87 
Growth rate of GDP  47  0.62  4.22  –14.36  10.03 
Lending rate  43  14.32  14.41  2.16  64.02 
Panel B: correlations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Short-term 
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4.2 Baseline  regressions 
Table 4.3 presents results from regressions on the cross-country data. The dependent 
variable is the local bonds held by foreign investors scaled by the size of GDP in the sample 
countries.
12 We first look at the regression results reported in Column (1) of Table 4.3. The 
explanatory variables are the log of the lending rate level in the country and the log of per 
capita GNP. We also include the growth rate of GNP. The coefficient on the lending rate level 
is positive and that on the growth rate of GNP is also positive, but both of these coefficients 
are not significant at conventional levels. The coefficient on per capita GNP is positive and 
significant at the 1% significance level. This implies that richer countries attract more 
investment in local bond markets from abroad. 
In Column (2) we examine whether the cross-country variation in the creditor rights index 
explains the variation in foreign bond investments. The coefficient on the creditor rights index 
is again not statistically significant. In the regression in Column (3), we drop the creditor 
rights index and replace it with the property rights index. The coefficient on the property 
rights index variable is positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on the per 
capita GNP loses its significance, which indicates that the institutional variable is more 
important than the degree of economic development. 
The positive relation between foreign bond investments and the strength of property rights 
protection supports the view that property rights protection allows more efficient contracting, 
and that foreign investors are willing to take part in countries where property rights protection 
is strong. Together with other variables, the property rights index explains about 38.5% of the 
variation in cross-country foreign bond investments. Notice also that the explanatory power 
significantly increases from the regression in Column (1) by 14.7 percentage points to 38.5%. 
The fact that the creditor rights index does not explain the cross-country variation in foreign 
bond investments supports the argument that what matters to foreign investors is not the 
actual law that provides creditor rights protection, but, instead, how the law is enforced. The 
enforcement is a function of property rights protection. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999) reach a similar conclusion. These authors argue that a direct statistical relation 
between the existence of creditor rights and financial contracts is not expected, because the 
“existence of rights may be necessary but not sufficient to make a financial contract 
enforceable.” In a different context, Esty (2002) finds that creditor rights and property rights 
affect foreign bank participation in project loan syndicates. 
When both the property rights index and the creditor rights index variables are included 
together with the log of per capita GNP and the log of lending rates (in COLUMN (4)), only 
the property rights index variable is statistically significant. 
Our results provide additional evidence in the literature underscoring the importance of 
property rights protection in the development of debt markets. Miller and Puthenpurackal 
(2002) examine the costs, wealth effects and determinants of international capital raising for 
a sample of 260 public debt issues made by non-US firms in the yankee bond market. They 
find that investors demand economically significant premiums on bonds issued by firms that 
are located in countries that do not protect investors’ rights and do not have a prior history of 
ongoing disclosure. Their results support the idea that better legal protections and more 
detailed information disclosure increases the price investors will pay for financial assets. Bae 
and Goyal (2003) examine how property rights affect private contracting in bank loan 
markets. They find that when property rights are weaker, banks offer less credit, charge 
higher spreads and lend only on a short-term basis. 
                                                  
12  We also scale the foreign investor-held bonds by the size of the bond markets in the sample countries. The 
results are similar.  
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Table 4.3 
Regression of bond holdings by foreign investors on 
property rights index and macroeconomic variables 
Panel A. Short-term paper 









































Observations 45  43  45  43 
Adjusted R-squared  0.238 0.200  0.385 0.356 
Panel B. Long-term bonds 









































Observations 45  43  45  43 
Adjusted R-squared  0.236 0.217  0.311 0.303 
The table presents results from cross-sectional regression of bond holdings by foreign investors. The sample 
includes 45 countries. The dependent variable is the short/long-term bonds held by foreign investors as of the 
end of 2001 over GDP. Independent variables include the inflation rate and log of per capita GNP, property 
rights index, creditor rights index. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level. 
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While not reported, we also examine whether property right protection affects the trading 
activity of foreign investors in local bond markets. We compute the size of bond portfolio 
flows between the United States and each country in our sample. US investors represent a 
significant fraction of the portfolio capital flows. Furthermore, comparable data are not 
available from other countries. The monthly flow of portfolio capital between the United 
States and virtually every country in the world is made available online by the US Treasury 
Department starting with 1988 data.
13 We use the sum of inward and outward flows of US 
investors scaled by the market’s GDP to proxy for the amount of bond portfolio activity 
crossing a particular country’s borders in a particular month. The results show that we 
observe more active foreign trading activity in countries with strong property rights. 
4.3 Robustness  tests 
This section presents results from sensitivity tests that examine whether there are other 
explanations for our results. A concern with cross-country analysis is that the regression may 
omit an important explanatory variable that is really driving the result and that is highly 
correlated with property rights protection. To rule out several alternative explanations, we 
have experimented with other plausible institutional and macroeconomic factors and examine 
if including them reduces the significance of the coefficient on the property rights index. In 
particular, we focus on the legal origin dummies, country risk and variables that measure the 
size and activity of debt and equity markets. These sensitivity tests rule out a large number of 
alternative explanations. 
Legal origin dummies: La Porta et al (1998) show that the legal origin of a country’s laws 
explains the degree of investor protection in that country. English common-law countries 
offer creditors stronger legal protection against managers. German civil-law countries are 
protective of secured creditors. Scandinavian civil-law countries are the best in law 
enforcement. The legal variables are from the La Porta et al (1998) dataset. While the results 
are not reported, none of the legal origin dummy variables is significant. 
We also examine the effect that including only the French legal origin dummy has on the 
coefficient of the property rights index in the baseline regression. French civil-law countries 
are considered weak in investor protection. However, these unreported results show that the 
conclusions are not sensitive to the set of legal origin dummies included in the regression. 
The French legal origin dummy continues to remain insignificant while the property rights 
index remains positive and significant at the 1% level. 
GNP growth volatility: To address concerns that per capita GNP or the lending rate level 
does not adequately capture country risk, we include GNP growth volatility as an additional 
measure of country risk. GNP growth volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
annual growth rate in GNP. As one would predict, the coefficient on the GNP growth rate 
volatility is negative but not significant. The inclusion of GNP growth volatility does not 
change our main results on the property rights index. 
Size of stock market: We examine the stock market capitalisation to GDP ratio, which equals 
the value of listed shares divided by the GDP and the stock market total value traded to 
GDP. Our results on the importance of the property rights index are robust to controlling for 
the importance of the stock market in the economy. In addition, our results are robust to the 
inclusion of variables that measure the size of the bond markets and the size of the primary 
equity markets. 
                                                  
13  The data were downloaded from www.treas.gov/tic/country-longterm.html, and are also available in the 
Treasury’s monthly bulletin. Across our sample of emerging market countries, only Sri Lanka lacks data from 
this source.  




Panel A. Short-term paper 

















































English origin dummy  2.463 
(1.77) 
   




   




   
GNP growth volatility    –0.329 
(0.29) 
  
Stock market cap/GDP      –0.113* 
(0.61) 
 
Country credit rating        0.717 
(4.56) 
Observations 43  43  43  36 
Adjusted R-squared  0.390 0.361  0.396  0.285 
Panel B. Long-term bonds 
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Table 4.4 (cont) 
Robustness tests 
Panel B. Long-term bonds (cont) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
















English origin dummy  –0.424 
(10.65) 
   




   




   
GNP growth volatility    –3.014* 
(1.80) 
  
Stock market cap/GDP      –0.275 
(0.40) 
 
Country credit rating        38.769 
(28.36) 
Observations 43  43  43  36 
Adjusted R-squared  0.391 0.335  0.293  0.206 
The table presents results from an additional cross-sectional regression of bond holdings by foreign investors 
to test the robustness of results reported in Table 3. The sample includes 45 countries. The dependent variable 
is the short/long-term bonds held by foreign investors as of the end of 2001 over GDP. This table presents 
several additional country level regressions of country median loan spreads to test the robustness of results 
reported in Table 4.3. Independent variables include the lending rate and log of per capita GNP, property rights 
index, creditor rights index, legal tradition dummies, GNP growth volatility, stock market capitalisation over 
GDP and country credit rating. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Country credit rating: We examine if our results survive when we include the country credit 
rating. We use Standard and Poor’s Foreign Currency Sovereign Credit Rating as a proxy for 
country credit rating. While not reported, we also examine country credit rating scores 
obtained from IMD survey data as of 2001 and find similar results. The S&P ratings data are 
available for 40 countries. For our sample countries, the S&P ratings range from AAA to B− 
with a rank of one to 16. We convert these rank values to continuous variables. Intuitively, 
bonds of countries with better credit ratings are likely to be preferred by foreign investors and 
one would expect that this variable is positively related to our dependent variable. The results 
show that the property rights index is significant and positive in explaining both short-term 
and long-term bonds held by foreign investors even after controlling for credit rating. 
However, for long-term bonds, neither the property rights index nor the country credit rating 
is significant, perhaps due to strong correlation between these two variables. 
2002 data: To examine if the results are robust across time, we reexamine the data in year 
2002. The results are very similar to those using the data in year 2001.  
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These sensitivity tests show that our results concerning the relation between property rights 
protection and foreign bond investments are robust. 
5.  Summary and conclusions 
This paper investigated how the protection of property rights affects foreign bond 
investments. Some countries provide stronger protection for private property rights than do 
other countries. The rights that lenders have are likely to be better enforced in countries with 
stronger protection of property rights. We asked if cross-country differences in property rights 
protection affect foreign bond holdings, after controlling for cross-country differences in 
macroeconomic variables including GNP per capita, lending rates and/or inflation rates and 
exchange rates. 
Our findings suggest that differences in property rights protection translate into large 
differences in foreign bond investments. In countries that provide weak property rights 
protection, foreign investors make smaller investments. 
These results imply that by improving property rights protection, a country or region can 
expect to attract foreign interest and participation in local or regional bond markets. To the 
extent that foreign investors play a vital role in providing liquidity, our evidence shows that 
improving property rights protection is a matter of prime importance. 
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